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Moral psychology once regarded ethics of care as a promising theory. However, there is
evidence to suggest that nowadays moral psychology completely ignores ethics of care’s
various insights. Moreover, ethics of care’s core concepts – compassion, dependence, and
the importance of early relations to moral development– are no longer considered to be
relevant to the development of new theories in the ﬁeld. In this paper, I will ﬁrstly discuss
some of the reasons which, over recent years, have contributed to the marginalization of
the role of ethics of care in moral psychology. Next, I will show that ethics of care’s most
promising idea centered on the care given to an infant and the importance of that care
to the development of moral thinking. In this context, I will be describing the implications
of John Bowlby’s attachment theories, infant research, ﬁndings in moral psychology and
neuroscience. I will argue that ethics of care needs to be radically re-thought and replaced
by a psychology of care, an attachment approach to moral judgment, which would establish
the centrality of the caregiver’s role in moral development. The philosophical implications
of this approach to the understanding of the “rationalists” and “intuitionists” debate about
the true nature of moral judgment is also discussed.
Keywords: ethics of care, attachment theory, moral development, infant research, moral psychology, mind
perception
Ethics of care is in a puzzling situation. It is dying as a moral
psychology but prospering as an ethical theory. It is very inﬂu-
ential in disciplines such as philosophy (Slote, 2006), nursing
(Bowden, 1995), social work (Bolmsjö et al., 2006), and educa-
tion (Noddings, 1984). And yet, none of its core ideas impact on
contemporary moral psychology. Considering that ethics of care,
shaped by psychologist Carol Gilligan, was originally developed as
a sub-discipline of moral psychology, its lack of inﬂuence in that
particular area requires further enquiry.
Ethics of care is well recognized as a normative ethical
theory – a theory about what makes actions right or wrong (All-
mark, 1995). It occupies a prominent place among a cluster of
normative ethical theories advanced by feminists in the second
half of the 20th century. It was successful in establishing a sig-
niﬁcant alternative to Kant’s moral philosophy, utilitarianism and
virtue theory (Slote, 2006). By placing the emphasis on the way
in which the work and practice of care originates in the private
realm, it distinguishes itself from the nurturing of the character
of the Man of Virtue, or the Man of Reason’s exercise of universal
rationality in the public realm (Held, 2006).
It can be assumed that a theory will mostly be employed in the
ﬁeld in which it resolves a conceptual or empirical problem with
which that particular discipline is preoccupied. (Laudan, 1977).
Nowadays, care ethics is considered to be a key concept in ethi-
cal debates linked to routine work in social work and nursing –
the allocation of resources, the preference given to certain popu-
lations or patients, and the way in which a patient or any other
individual in need should be treated. That particular perspective
has led to the development of important insights into the moral
values involved in the caring practices applied to family relations,
relations between friends, and individual care giving.
Ethics of care gave to the world a way of thinking which shed
new light on these issues and provided possible solutions. As
a result, today the terms “caring,” “nursing,” “social work,” and
“ethics of care” are inextricably linked.
In the making of moral decisions about routine issues related
to care, ethics of care takes into account considerations that tra-
ditional moral theories did not recognize as legitimate. It differs
from the traditional Kantian formulation according to which wel-
fare policy has to be set according to universal laws of justice, as
well as from the idea that cold rationality is more important than
emotion in resolving a moral dilemma.
However, ethics of care’s inﬂuence on contemporarymoral psy-
chology is negligible. Its diminished contemporary status is in
marked contrast to the promising start made during the 1980s
when care ethics was the ﬁrst theory to challenge Lawrence
Kohlberg’s moral psychology which had dominated the ﬁeld for
many years. Gilligan’s (1982) book, In a Different Voice, has
been widely read and is one of the most inﬂuential works in
the feminist discourse. It was acclaimed by feminist historians
and philosophers, some of whom appeared to be trying to inte-
grate its ﬁndings and suggestions into their own scholarship
(Kerber, 1986). But ethics of care has had little impact on con-
temporary moral psychology and is nowadays hardly discussed
or mentioned within that discipline. The key theories of con-
temporary moral psychology include: Universal Moral Grammar
(Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007); Moral Foundation Theory (Haidt,
2007; Graham and Haidt, 2010); Relation Regulation Theory
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(Rai and Fiske, 2011); The character view of morality – how
we tend not to judge speciﬁc acts but rather the agents who
perform them (Alicke, 2000; Pizarro and Tannenbaum, 2012).
Finally, there is the theory suggesting that moral judgments are
driven by two core factors—affective reactions and cognitive pro-
cesses (Nichols, 2002; Greene, 2007). None of these theories
place the key concepts of ethics of care – compassion, con-
cern, relations, and dependence – at the center of their moral
thinking. Nor do they refer to ethics of care as a source of inﬂu-
ence. Even theories that have much to say about emotions being
central to moral judgment do not see in ethics of care a possi-
ble source of inspiration and make no reference to it (Nichols,
2002).
As a school of thought ethics of care is not a participant in
the essential and fascinating discourse on the nature of moral-
ity which some psychologists and philosophers are engaged in.
Other that Carol Gilligan, the leading ﬁgures identiﬁed with ethics
of care are drawn from the ﬁelds of education, philosophy, and
political science, not psychology. What was once considered as
being almost the only alternative to Kohlberg’s theory, is not men-
tioned in the important primary books on morality such as The
Moral Psychology Handbook (2010); Moral Psychology : Histor-
ical and Contemporary Readings (2010); or Moral Psychology :
A Contemporary Introduction. The same can be said about the
entry for “moral psychology” in The Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy published by Stanford University. In all, ethics of care has
been pushed into the important but limited niche of feminist
ethics.
Indeed care ethics, and feminist ethics are often treated as syn-
onymous. According to the APA PsycNet, in the 20 years between
1992 and 2012, 45 articles were published in which ethics of care
was a central topic and appeared in the article’s title. Most of the
studies (51%) were of a general theoretical kind and only 31%
dealt with issues related to gender. Out of the 45 articles on ethics
of care only 17% were based on empirical research within the ﬁeld
of psychology.
As these alternative theories have developed over the last
15 years, the inﬂuence of ethics of care has waned. However, the
sheer indifference of contemporary moral psychology to issues
of care, relations, and dependency, suggests that other reasons
beyond the emergence of alternative theoretical models may have
been responsible for the diminished inﬂuence of ethics of care in
contemporary moral psychology.
The next segment will examine the possible reasons for the
theory’s irrelevancy to moral psychology, and draw a number of
conclusions that may be helpful to our current understanding of
this discipline.
REASONS FOR ETHIC OF CARE’S IRRELEVANCY TO MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY
The ﬁrst reason for the irrelevancy of care ethics to moral psychol-
ogy is the name of the theory itself: the title places an emphasis on
the philosophical rather than the psychological application of the
theory. Thus, the latter merely serves as a backdrop to the ethical
aspects but is not researched in its own right.
The reasonwhy ethics of care triumphed over the psychology of
care is directly related to the debate betweenKohlberg andGilligan.
Kohlberg (1963a,b), was deeply inﬂuenced by Kant’s moral theo-
ries. His six stages of moral development are in line with Kantian
moral perceptions.
Thus, a subject reaching the most advanced stage, known as
universal ethical principles, would know that laws are valid only
insofar as they are grounded in justice, and that a commitment
to justice carries with it an obligation to disobey unjust laws.
Kohlberg would consistently espouse a rationalist view in which
reason takes account of emotion. However, reason, not affect, was
always for him the ultimate judge.
Gilligan, on the other hand, offered a different view on ethical
reasoning. While investigating the moral thinking of women, she
found that mature, adult, intelligent women, do not think about
moral problems in an abstract and impersonal way or in terms
of justice, but rather in terms of personal moral responsibility.
Responsibility for and protection of the other, Gilligan suggested,
is at the core of women’s moral thinking. Men, on the other hand,
see a moral problem as one that can be resolved in terms of right
and wrong. Gilligan argued that although the reasoning of women
when making moral choices is different, it is no less logical or
mature than that of Kohlberg and Kant.
The argument, therefore, is not only a question of the exis-
tence or nature of gender differences regarding patterns of moral
thinking. Rather it is a debate about what form of moral thinking
is more developed, mature or advanced – in this case the logical
versus the compassionate. Thus the argument steered away from
psychology and became part of the realm of philosophy.
The second reason for the irrelevancy of ethics of care is linked
to the fact that the theory showed little interest in the questions
that preoccupy moral psychology such as; what is the basis of
morality (cognition, intuition, or culture)? What are the sources
of evil? How is one supposed to draw up the parameters of blame
ascription?
In fact, ethics of care took a closer interest in the psychology
of women than it did in moral judgment. The idea that women
deﬁne themselves through a web of relationships of intimacy and
care rather than through a hierarchy based on separation and self-
fulﬁllment, runs as a leitmotif through Gilligan’s theory giving it
much of its structure and attraction.
The developmental theory espoused by ethics of care is also not
exactly a theory of moral development. Indeed, it should rather
be viewed as a theory of the development of gender identiﬁca-
tion, achieved through the child’s relations with its mother. Whilst
girls attain their gender roles through resemblance and connect-
edness with their mothers, boys attain them through distinction
and separation. Therefore, in adolescence, boys have to learn how
to deal with relationships despite their fundamental sense of sep-
arateness and distinctiveness, whereas girls must grapple with the
task of establishing their distinct identity while holding on to their
relationships with others.
Ultimately, Gilligan (1982, p. 100) argues, men and women
claim different moral imperatives: women feel “a responsibility to
discern and alleviate the ‘real and recognizable trouble’ of this
world,” whereas men’s moral imperative “appears rather as an
injunction to respect the rights of others.” From this we can see
that moral judgment is a product of the different patterns that
characterize men and women.
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The third reason for the irrelevancy of care ethics to moral psy-
chology is linked to its close tie with feminist ideology. This tie
was important in the past because at the time moral psychology
served as a means of excluding and derogating women. For exam-
ple, Piaget (1965/1932, p. 77) wrote that “The most superﬁcial
observation is sufﬁcient to show that, in the main, the legal sense
is far less developed in little girls than in boys.” Kohlberg’s moral
development scale paved the way for similar thinking, providing
biased measures for those who wish to show that, once again in
this area too, males are superior.
Gilligan’s contention is that the lack of female development
assumed in such studies was the outcome of an injustice inherent
in the research itself, which, she claimed, was essentially based on
research intomale subjects. The result, according toGilligan (1982,
p. 6), was that the observations of psychologists were biased; by
“implicitly adopting the male life as the norm, they have tried to
fashionwomenout of amasculine cloth.”The speciﬁcmoral devel-
opment of women, Gilligan (1982, p. 31) noted, “falls through the
sieve” of a male dominated tradition of research.
In fact, Gilligan found that the voices of women had either
been excluded from the research on ethics or had been considered
inferior. She thus embarked on giving expression to the voice that
had not been heard.
As critics pointed out, the problem was that this single-minded
focus on women’s own culture, risks ignoring the larger social
and historical developments of which it was a part (Kerber, 1986),
hence maintaining cultural exclusion. As a result, it trapped the
important ideas linked to ethics of care in an isolated ideological
ghetto where everything entering that ghetto was automatically
identiﬁed with the idea that women were different from, and
usually superior to, men (Dubois et al., 1980).
The fourth reason for the irrelevancy of ethics of care is linked
to the difﬁculty that the theory had in substantiating its assump-
tions through empirical research. In Walker (1984) published a
broadly based study which analyzed 61 works of research using
Kohlberg’s model to assess the level of moral reasoning achieved
by both genders. This showed that, in general, there were no
differences between the sexes either in childhood or adulthood.
Moreover, it demonstrated that in those instances where such dis-
parities were identiﬁed, the data included in the study revealed that
the men in question were more highly educated than the women
surveyed. Therefore, education, not gender, was the explanation
for the women appearing to have achieved a lesser level of moral
reasoning. There is no indication inWalker’s comprehensive study
that the two sexes follow separate paths in relation to their moral
thinking about conceptual, theoretical issues.
Gilligan (1986), disagreed with the results of this research,
insisting that other studies had, in fact, found differences in moral
thinking between men and women. Speciﬁcally, Gilligan claimed,
there were ﬁndings showing that men tend to deﬁne and resolve
moral problems within the framework of the justice system, even
though they do admittedly introduce considerations of care into
their thinking. Girls and women, on the other hand, focus on care
in moral reasoning, making the concentration on care a typically
female phenomenon.
The ﬁfth reason for the irrelevancy of care ethics, is linked to
the fact that the debate between Kohlberg and Gilligan was mainly
about peoples’ reasoning in relation to moral situations. This
debate became very outdated when moral psychologists found
that reasoning played a negligible role in moral judgment. What
this ﬁnding in fact claimed, was that much like other cognitive
processes moral judgments appear in consciousness automati-
cally and effortlessly as the result of moral intuitions and before
any conscious processing has occurred (Bargh and Chartrand,
1999). Moral reasoning, it follows, is an effortful process in which
a person searches for arguments that will support a judgment
already reached (Haidt, 2012). Emotions and affects are the basis
of judgment and not logical arguments (Haidt, 2000).
Again, ethics of care had little to say on these matters. In fact,
the debate between Kohlberg and Gilligan was so central to the
identity of care ethics that when Kohlberg’s theory began to be
outdated and lose its relevance the same happened to ethics of
care.
REPLACING ETHICS OF CARE WITH PSYCHOLOGY OF CARE
If we were to strip the psychology of care ethics (elsewhere I have
called it an attachment approach to moral judgment, Govrin,
2014), of all the components that have been refuted by empiri-
cal research, we would be left with just one main psychological
element of the theory: the idea that care giving and the primary
relations between mother and child are of central importance to
moral judgment. This idea constitutes a breakthrough in moral
psychology that is yet to be properly understood. Though origi-
nally ethics of care emphasized this link, it did not dwell on its
universal importance to the development of moral thinking for
both men and women.
As opposed to ethics of care, psychology of care should base its
development on our common universal experience of caring and
being cared for as a child. Human survival is dependent on the
existence of caring relationships, a fact that clearly applies to both
genders. Infants would not survive were it not for the presence of
a caregiver. Moreover, the practice of care is also of importance
when it meets more than just the bare requirements of survival.
Having survived infancy, children are unlikely to develop well in
the next stages of life unless they are loved and valued for who they
are. By stressing the extent to which humans are dependent and in
need of signiﬁcant levels of care from others, care psychology can
make a hugely important contribution to moral psychology. Any
moral psychology that does not take dependency into account is
necessarily inadequate (Held, 2006).
The idea that the care given at the beginning of life is cen-
tral to the development of moral mechanisms, is consistent with
moral psychology’s search in recent years for the “universal factor”
underlying moral judgment. For example, an important theory in
moral psychology known as Universal Moral Grammar (UMG), is
ultimately predicated on a belief that every human being possesses
a faculty of moral judgment, the normal development of which
is largely unaffected by racial, cultural, or even educational differ-
ences (Mikhail, 2007). A view commonly expressed today is that
we are born with certain abstract rules or principles which set the
parameters and guide us toward the acquisitionof particularmoral
systems. Researchers who adopt this view often compare moral
acquisition to language acquisition (e.g., Hauser, 2006; Roedder
and Harman, 2010).
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If, indeed, such a comparison is valid, it follows that, similarly to
what happens with language acquisition, there has to be a stimulus
that triggers the acquisition of morality. Care is the appropriate
stimulus that is likely to lead to the learning of the proper processes
which guide us in the making of moral judgments.
As we shall see, infant research shows that meaningful social
learning takes place through the interaction between the infant
and the caregiver. If psychology of care was able to demonstrate
the way in which such learning are linked to morality, it would
have the potential to show the following: that the universal foun-
dation of our moral faculties is linked to the fact that all humans
are born into a state of absolute dependence on the mothers
who raise them. And, secondly, that the learning which grows
out of this context enables us to distinguish between right and
wrong.
In order to substantiate the logic of this thesis I will attempt
to establish the idea that the learning that occurs in the ﬁrst year
of life creates the infrastructure and the basis for learning at a
later stage. In addition I will argue that this is linked to the initial
interactions between the infant and the caregiver and can lead
to the development of moral faculties (For a detailed model see
Govrin, 2014).
JOHN BOWLBY AND THE ORIGINS OF MORALITY
More than 60 years ago, the British psychoanalyst John Bowlby
developed a highly innovative view of the process by which infants
acquire moral sense through their attachment to their caregivers.
Much like the originators of ethics of care, Bowlby believed that the
key role in this process is the intra-psychic structure and affective
experience that are developed in the infant–caregiver bond.
Most people are familiar with attachment theory’s division of
attachment into four styles. However, a more fundamental subject
of research is how the initial attachment shapes the organization
of our thinking and determines our emotional syntax (Fonagy
and Target, 2007). Bowlby linked delinquency to a breach in the
relationship between the child and his mother. In his study of 44
juvenile thieves (Bowlby, 1944), he explored the link between the
nature and extent of the child’s disorder and resultant delinquent
behavior, as well as the question of when, and in what way, the
breach between mother and child ﬁrst occurred (Bowlby, 1958,
1969).
In Bowlby’s view, when it comes to attachment issues, the crit-
ical period in the infant’s life is between the ages of 6 months and
3 years. He believed that deprivation at any time after the ﬁrst
6 months of life was likely to seriously affect the child’s ability to
try and become emotionally involved with other people; to love, to
trust, or to feel safe in having and giving expression to conﬂicting
emotions. This was due to the fact that experiencing separation at
that particular stage of life would, in all probability, interfere with
the still emerging realization of his dependence on others. Today
we know that the etiology of delinquency is far more complex
than Bowlby thought, and is inﬂuenced by many factors. How-
ever, Bowlby paved the way for the establishment of attachment as
the foundation of moral development.
Ethics of care and attachment theory have essentially the same
view about attachment as a key factor in moral behavior. Both
share the idea that the objective quality of parental care is central
not only to the child’s survival but to his experience of himself
and of the world. Thus, the two theories complement each other.
Attachment theory after Bowlby paid little attention to moral
development and when it did so it was in general terms. Ethics
of care included an expansive reference to moral psychology but
paid little attention to the care given during the ﬁrst year of life in
which the processes of gender identiﬁcation have still not begun.
Combining the two theories would help to establish a theoretical
psychological infrastructure for psychology of care that will pro-
vide us with a more comprehensive explanation of contemporary
ﬁndings.
THE FORGOTTEN MOTHER- THE CAREGIVER ROLE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL JUDGMENT
Bowlby’s attachment theory was the ﬁrst psychological proposi-
tion to place maternal care at the center of human psychological
development. But even 60 years later, when researches are exceed-
ingly aware of the fact that moral and social faculties already begin
to develop in the ﬁrst year of life, they do not make room for, or
place any importance on, the maternal role in this development.
In most of the studies, infants are still being perceived apart from
their surroundings as if they possessed an isolated mind that was
developing separately from the environment in which they were
growing up. For example, Hamlin et al. (2010), argue that the
capacity of infants to evaluate individuals on the basis of their
social interactions is unlearned. Likewise, Hoffman (2001), one
of the most proliﬁc writers in the ﬁeld, thinks that the empathic
and social faculties of infants develop “naturally” without prior
experience.
Even though infants’ social and empathic abilities are a salient
feature of any contemporary book on moral development, the role
of the caregiver in moral development was not directly theorized
nor studied. This lacuna has a long history in moral psychology
that stretches from Piaget and Kohlberg until the emergence of
care ethics and now within contemporary moral psychology.
Why is the centrality of the infant–caregiver bond so easy
to dismiss? As Mitchell (2000) points out, this tendency to
ignore and dismiss must surely have something to do with con-
fusion about the way in which the development of the mind
differs from that of the body. Our body’s sequence of develop-
ment seems to be more or less pre-programmed. This manifests
itself in the way in which, with the passage of time, people
mature in an ordered way. From immobility, the infant pro-
gresses to being able to turn over, then to pull himself up,
then to crawl and ﬁnally to walk. Aside from those who suffer
from a severe physical handicap of some sort, we all ultimately
gain control over our bodies and become physically functional
almost entirely through our own efforts. It is tempting to believe
that our minds develop in a similar way. This temptation leads
us to take for granted our independent mental existence in
much the same way as we presume our independent physical
existence.
The next segment will summarize some of the important
research accumulated on infant development during the ﬁrst year
of life. This will aim to show that the probable centrality of the
caregiver during that early period of life has a great inﬂuence on
the moral representations the infant acquires.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FIRST YEAR TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL AND MORAL JUDGMENT
Over the past 20 years, as infant research has become increas-
ingly more sophisticated and complex, we have learned that
infants possess a much more intricate and far richer knowledge
of the world than had previously been supposed (Mandler and
McDonough, 1998). This knowledge precedes the development of
gender consciousness.
Infants learn a great deal about their physical world (e.g.,
Gelman, 1990; Spelke et al., 1992; Baillargeon, 1993), and the
knowledge they accumulate during the ﬁrst year of life forms the
foundation on which later learning, including language acquisi-
tion, counting, object categorization, social relations, and other
complex cognitive skills, rest (e.g., Wynn, 1990; Mandler and
McDonough, 1998).
As far as morality goes, we now know that at 7 or 8 months
infants have speciﬁc capacities related to moral judgment (e.g.,
Meltzoff and Moore, 1995; Gergely, 2011), which enable them
to judge a person’s character by his behavior toward others. For
example, at 8 months infants show a preference for a character
that is actively helpful to others as opposed to someone who is
indifferent to those aroundhim. Theyhave even less of a preference
for a character that actively hampers the progress of others. This
faculty may be the basis of moral thought and action in later life
(Hamlin et al., 2010).
Similarly, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that expec-
tations of social relations emerge in the ﬁrstmonths of life through
infant–caregiver interactions (for reviews see Beebe, 2005). For
example, the infant develops an awareness of a principle known as
“ongoing regulations” (Beebe and Lachmann, 2002, p. 60), which
enables him to form and organize basic representations of mother-
infant interactions which will later in life help him to predict
certain behaviors and their consequences. If his expectations are
violated, he will invest a great deal of effort in resolving these
breeches, a principle known as “disruption and repair.” Consis-
tently, infantswere found to be affectively reactive to violations and
conﬁrmations of anticipation (DeCasper and Carstens, 1980). It
is from these primary interactions that the infant develops expec-
tations of relational patterns, remembers them, and categorizes
them (Hauser, 2006).
Thus, the research showed that infants learn the basic princi-
ples of relations between two people. They develop a whole array
of expectations by observing their caregiver. There are reason-
able grounds for assuming that later on in life moral judgments
are made on the basis of these expectations. Infants respond with
unease to any violation of an expectation.
Therefore, a psychology of care that supersedes ethics of care
can showhow the initial interactions of infants with their caregiver
prepare them for the acquisition of knowledge that later on will
be relevant in conceptualizing moral situations and the creation
of the in-depth structures of moral knowledge.
MORAL JUDGMENTS IN TERMS OF EXPECTANCIES AND
TRANSGRESSIONS
One can regard moral failure as a violation of our expectations.
When an individual acts contrary to our expectations of him
we usually consider their action wrong. When individuals act
in a way that is consistent with expectations, we assume their
action to be right, even if we do not openly classify it as such
(Hauser, 2006).
As said, the array of an infant’s expectations develops out of the
initial contactwith the caregiver. If care represents the expectations
the infant has of the caregiver – the feelings, actions, thoughts
that are intended to protect the infant and raise him – then
moral failure represents the very opposite. The infant can develop
expectations of the caregiver – an adult who is powerful and inde-
pendent, will meet his needs, and offer protection. From this
comes the idea that the strong and the big have to take care of
the dependent and the weak. It may be that this becomes part
of intuitive knowledge acquired outside of consciousness and the
means by which we get to know how to analyze a conﬂict between
two sides. On the basis of the infant’s ﬁrst experiences, an abil-
ity develops to identify in every conﬂict which of the two sides
is strong, responsible, mature, and in command of resources,
and which side is dependent and helpless. Thus, in an intuitive
way, deﬁned and clear expectations of the strong side develop
that relate to what he should and should not do to the weak
and vulnerable side. When we decide that someone is guilty of
a moral transgression, we can see it as a violation of the expecta-
tion of the way the strong and independent should behave toward
the weak and dependent. In this view, judging moral situations
means ﬁnding the asymmetry between two parties. This might
be the deep structure of all moral harm, the similar common
characteristic. It may be that breaking a conﬂict down to its
constituent parts and ﬁnding the “strong” “adult” and the “vul-
nerable dependent” is part of an innately set faculty. The child is
somehow prepared, ready, and able to acquire this capacity by
using experience from his ﬁrst interactions with the caregiver.
This experience is used to acquire the “core” syntax of moral
judgment.
This thesis can be enhanced by a series of studies by Gray et al.
(2012). Gray showed that moral judgments do not depend merely
on the superﬁcial properties of moral events, but also on how those
events are mentally represented.
One of Gray’s most important ﬁndings is that moral judgment
is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral
dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Inten-
tional agents are capable of intent and action due to capacities for
judgment or self-control, whereas moral patients are ones who are
capable of experiencing physical and emotional sensations.
Adult humans usually possess both characteristics of patients
and agents and can therefore be both blamed for evil and suffer
from it. A puppy, according to Gray, is a mere moral patient: we
seek to protect him from harm but do not blame him for injustice.
Gray posits that despite the variety of moral transgressions, the
moral dyad not only integrates across various moral transgres-
sions but also serves as a working model for understanding the
moral world. Through the dyadic template of morality we type-
cast people into two categories –moral agents ormoral patients—a
phenomenon Gray called moral typecasting. Typecasting deter-
mines our perception of the target person’s mind. A person who
does something evil will be immediately categorized as a moral
agent. This means that simply doing something good or evil can
bring with it corresponding attributions of intention, especially
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evil intentions. Likewise, when someone is categorized as a moral
patient, people automatically infer the capacity for experience and
greater sensitivity to pain (Gray and Wegner, 2009).
Psychology of care can therefore show that the moral dyad is
formed in our mind as a result of our inner schemas of chil-
dren (moral patients) and adults (moral agents) that we acquired
in the ﬁrst year of life. Thus, the rapid intuitive conceptualiza-
tion between moral patient and moral agent has its origins in
the period of care in which there were asymmetrical relations
between the two sides and in which the caregiver had to tend
to the infant’s needs. These interactions developed the infant’s
expectations about relations.
Gray thinks that agency is the factor that can distinguish
between the two sides of the dyad. If so, it makes dependency
the central feature of the dyad. Adult-like or child-like dimensions
are not necessarily related to speciﬁc age but to the quality of a
person or interaction. To put it more accurately, when we make a
moral judgment we are looking for cues of dependency and inde-
pendency. For example, people unconsciously associate disability
with child-like features (Robey et al., 2006). In another study, col-
lege students addressed people they believed to be adults with
disabilities much as they were in the habit of addressing a 12-year
old child (Liesener and Mills, 1999). The “detection” of child-
like and adult-like characteristics is not entirely rational and not
always relevant. For example, a number of experiments (e.g., Berry
and Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1985) indicate that baby-faced people
are less likely to lose their case than people considered to have an
“adult face”(Berry and Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988; Zebrowitz and
McDonald, 1991). If found guilty, a baby-faced defendant will be
considered less likely to have committed an offense intentionally,
and more likely to have offended by being negligent than would a
defendant with a mature face.
What might be further added to Gray’s account is the element
of expectations from the caregiver. Even if we match each party
to moral patient and moral agent schemas as Gray suggests, the
judgment remains incomplete. We do not simply compare the two
parties individually anddecidewhich one ismore helpless, needier,
or more powerful. Our judgment depends on something much
more profound. It is linked to the nature of the dyadic relations.
Just as we have different schemas for adults and children, so we
have a schema for the dyadic relations between them.
This representation consists of our expectations of what adults
should and should not do to children. Adults have obligations
toward children and we seem to know these obligations by heart.
Moral transgression might be perceived as violating our expec-
tations of moral agents to act in certain ways toward moral
patients. Exploring mother-infant interaction in the ﬁrst year of
life teaches us how the infant’s expectations of the patterns of
behavior of moral agents toward moral patients is formed and
how the infant develops pre-symbolic representations of moral
dyads. Psychology of care can lift the collaboration between moral
psychology and infant research to an exciting and creative new
level.
MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE HUMAN VISUAL SYSTEM
If humans treated every new right–wrong situation as a novel and
unique experience we would quickly drown, our minds bafﬂed
and confused. Conceivably, to make the judgment more efﬁcient,
the cognitive system groups moral situations into the meaning-
ful category of the Adult – Child format. Various aspects of
moral situations are perceived holistically rather than separately
or independently.
Gray et al. (2012), suggest that if our template of morality were
dyadic – perceived intentional moral agent and a suffering moral
patient – we would be compelled to complete the moral dyad if
it appeared to be incomplete. For example, when we see someone
blameworthy—an apparent moral agent—we would complete the
dyadby inferring thepresenceof another sufferingmind—amoral
patient. Gray suggests the phenomenon of dyadic completion
occurs at an intuitive level—like the Gestalt completion.
We do not know what neurobiological framework accounts
for the completion of the dyad. Most cognitive psychological
moral theories are formal and detached from neuroscience. I sug-
gest that much can be gained by taking advantage of the large
amount of information available on the neurophysiology of visual
recognition. Although moral judgments and visual recognition
are separate, unrelated domains, what might be of interest to
us is the ability of the brain to ﬁll in missing elements so that
visual recognition remains largely unaffected by the absence of
such components. Basically the thought is that visual images
constructed by the brain are holistic- i.e., are more complete
than one would expect from the linear sum of their individ-
ual parts. Human brain imaging research has strongly supported
such thinking by showing that one cannot explain the neuronal
activity measured in high order visual areas in response to a pic-
ture as representing the sum of the responses to the picture’s
elements.
Although visual recognition is a perceptual phenomenon, it
can also be regarded as an ubiquitous property of various types
of neural network models (Williams and Jacobs, 1997; Ullman,
1998). Such networks, upon being presented with a partial input
pattern, can settle quite rapidly into an attractor state matching
the complete stored pattern (Lerner et al., 2002).
Studies point to the lateral occipital complex (LOC) as a
central site in which object completion effects are manifested.
Other studies show that infants only a few months old complete
representations of objects even behind occluders (Kellman and
Spelke, 1983). Psychophysical experiments on adults suggest that
such completed representations determine the allocation of visual
attention (He and Nakayama, 1992).
One could argue that in the same way that areas in the brain
play a critical role in object completion other areas are dominant
in the completion of the dyadic Gestalt.
“HEINZ’S DILEMMA” AS SEEN FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A
PSYCHOLOGY OF CARE
Gilligan attempted to refute the claim that the moral reasoning of
women is immature because of its concern with immediate rela-
tions. The “care perspective,” Gilligan asserted, was an alternative
and equally valid formof moral reasoning unnoticed bymasculine
liberal justice traditions which, she argued, are driven by notions
of autonomy and independence.
Gilligan expressed these thematic perspectives through the
moral reasoning of “Jake” and “Amy,” two children in Kohlberg’s
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studies responding to the “Heinz dilemma.” In this dilemma, the
children are asked whether “Heinz” was justiﬁed in stealing an
expensive drug to save the life of his sick wife. Jake perceives the
Heinz dilemma as a mathematical problem. Seen from this view-
point the right to life wins over the right to property, so that all
“reasonable people” should conclude that Heinz was justiﬁed in
stealing the medicine. Amy, on the other hand, disagrees with the
idea thatHeinz’s theft was justiﬁed. Her concern is that hemight be
sent to prison and that his sick wife would consequently be left on
her own. ForAmy, the dilemma is a narrative of relations over time
involving ruptured links which have to be repaired through inter-
action. Amy’s understanding of the world is that its inhabitants
are not isolated from each other but rather belong to networks of
relationships. She is conﬁdent that once the pharmacist realizes
why Heinz stole the medicine he would be willing to cooperate
with Heinz.
Gilligan posited that men and women often speak different
languages which they think are the same. She used this idea to try
and moderate moral psychologists’ tendency to adopt the “male
perspective” as the model of good moral reasoning.
From the perspective of contemporary moral psychology,
Gilligan erred in attributing a great deal of importance to the
arguments underlying moral judgment. First of all, such argu-
ments are retrospective and are voiced only after the judgment has
already been made (Haidt, 2000). They therefore play a negligible
role in the decision making process. Secondly, as said, research has
revealed that, contrary to Gilligan’s view, arguments based on“jus-
tice” and “compassion” are used by men and women equally. It is
important to point out that though their reasoning differed, Amy
and Jake came to an identical conclusion regarding the impor-
tance of saving Heinz’s wife. From the viewpoint of a psychology
of care, the most important factor is that all those who were sur-
veyed, other than children less than four, regarded Heinz’s wife
as a severely ill woman who had to be saved, even if that meant
undermining another individual’s property rights. Even though
they used different arguments they gave the “right” answer. From
this perspective, Heinz’s dilemma can perhaps be seen as consti-
tuting a challenge to the capacity of moral reasoning, but does
not represent a serious moral dilemma. According to the psy-
chology of care, in order for Heinz’s dilemma to become a real
moral issue in which the participant has to decide between differ-
ent moral choices (as opposed to various arguments related to the
same choice) the“attachment”between the participant andHeinz’s
wife orHeinz himself has to be challenged. This can be done in one
of two ways: by reducing the elements of dependence/neediness
attributed to the wife, or by stressing the “dependency” – in this
case the child-like features of the chemist (or his family) from
whom Heinz stole the medicine. If, for example, Heinz’s wife is
revealed as a woman who committed a series of brutal murders in
her past, there are reasonable grounds to assume that that the par-
ticipants would hesitate before deciding whether the theft of the
medicine was justiﬁed. Similarly, they would be highly tentative
about reaching a conclusion if they were to discover that as a result
of the theft the chemist had lost an important source of income
intended for a heart transplant operation urgently required by his
infant son. This restructuring of the experiment turns the Heinz
conundrum into a real moral dilemma. In that they weaken the
understanding of Heinz’s wife or re-enforce the concern about
the chemist they are liable to make it difﬁcult for the brain to
think quickly and intuitively in Heinz’s favor and reach a clear
cut decision. And indeed what is common to all serious moral
dilemmas (such as aggressive methods of questioning terrorists or
the morality of the Allied bombing of Dresden during World War
II) is the difﬁculty of reaching an unequivocal decision as to the
extent of the neediness/dependency/weakness of the victim and
the aggressor.
PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
MORAL LAWS
The philosophical implications of the psychology of care are sig-
niﬁcant and cannot be detailed here. I will, however, dwell brieﬂy
on one issue.
Ever since the days of Aristotle and Plato there have been dis-
agreements in moral philosophy between“ rationalists” and“intu-
itionists” about the true nature of moral judgment (Beauchamp,
2001). The rationalists posit that people reach a moral decision
by thinking about the rights and wrongs of each case and then
making a deliberate and conscious moral judgment (e.g., Kant,
1785). Intuitionists and sentimentalists on the other hand, claim
that people reach moral judgments instinctively and can make
such judgments non-consciously (e.g., Hume, 1739).
To a large extent the drive behind care ethics is the belief
that the theories of the rationalist mainstream – and in partic-
ular Kantian ethics, utilitarianism and liberalism – provide an
insufﬁcient basis for the making of moral judgments. All three
approaches, it is argued, overlook the part played by people’s
emotional responses – especially empathy, sensitivity, and their
reaction to particular“others”– in reachingmoral decisions. Ethics
of care further argues that utilitarianism andKantian ethics reduce
moral understanding to the presentation of a single principle and
consider “abstract rules” to be the foundation of moral guidance.
Psychology of care can be a link between these two approaches.
Whilst the protection of the young is very common among mam-
mals, humans, by virtue of their developed abilities (symbolic,
linguistic, and logo- mathematical skills), are able to forge out
of what are essentially biologically driven patterns of behavior
a set of general and abstract principles. For example, the fea-
tures associated with an infant such as neediness, dependency,
and helplessness, are part of virtually every culture. They have
also been extended to additional populations such as the elderly
and the handicapped because the neediness and injury of these
communities can be likened to the dependence and injury of
infants/children. Feelings we have toward children are directed
at a number of populations identiﬁed by their particular char-
acteristics. Moral feelings are a combination of cognitive and
emotional abilities. The cognitive achievement is the ability to
equate those who belong to the moral community with depen-
dents. It includes the generalization of feelings to one’s own child
and to other individuals on the basis of similarity (i.e., Hand-
icapped = child). The emotional capacity directs the array of
feelings such as concern, compassion, and sympathy – originally
focused on the person’s own progeny – toward other unre-
lated needy individuals. Secondly, humans have the ability to
enact abstract laws related to moral situations. They can, for
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example, imagine moral situations prior to them happening or
think about various values behind moral situations (“the sanc-
tity of life” “the right to freedom”). Humans have the capacity to
enact laws ordering the relations between people which deter-
mine norms of behavior. They do not need speciﬁc dyads in
order to understand dyadic laws and in order to formulate them.
Basic laws and moral principles play a very important role in
society.
Without laws to guide him, the individual psychological mech-
anism which is part of every person’s make-up cannot be a good
basis for a moral judgment to be made. Though the mechanism
of breaking down the moral situation into its constituent parts
of caregiver/infant is universal, the substantive decision is cul-
ture dependent and subjective. The vastly different ways in which
people react to moral issues stems from the fact that the judg-
ment concerning which dyads “activate” the moral mechanism
and which dyads do not, is an entirely subjective decision. Not
every asymmetrical moral situation, or set of circumstances in
which the weak party is hurt, is perceived as a moral violation.
There are many situations in which ostensibly the “strong party”
has hurt the “weak party”. However, the situation in its entirety
does not activate the affective and cognitive mechanism required
in order to reach a moral judgment. The psychic system, espe-
cially its affective parts, simply does not interpret the situation as
“strong hurts weak.” This may be due to a number of reasons.
For example, it may be that the “weak” party has been “dehu-
manized” to the extent that the empathic response to its injury
is muted. There may be an identiﬁcation with the “strong party,”
or an understanding of the reasons which have led it to harm the
weak. Alternatively, it may be that the “weak party” is thought to
be to blame for what has happened or is perceived as dangerous.
The personal values which each one of us believes in also enter
into this mix. The instability and caprice of the subjective moral
system is not a mechanism one can rely on in maintaining a moral
and lawful society.
General moral principles such as those suggested by Rawls and
Kant, enable us to rise above the subjective dyad. Turning the
moral mechanism into a universal law enables us to protect the
weak andpreventmoral injustices, independently of the emotional
mechanism that links an individual to a particular dyad. In the
absence of this human ability to establish abstract laws therewould
likely be an anarchic situation in which the moral mechanism as
described would be activated arbitrarily in line with the individual
interests and needs of every single person.
The ability to enact a moral law is a human achievement of
the utmost importance. It enables society to dictate to people who
should be protected – in other words who is within the moral
community and is therefore worthy of protection – instead of
leaving this judgment in the hands of anyone and everyone. Laws
such as Kant’s categorical imperative or Rawls’s veil of ignorance
are aimed at conceptualizing the psychological mechanism to such
a degree that the moral decision is distanced from the concrete
dyad and subjective feelings and is determined solely by noble
values of justice and morality.
It is important to understand that Kant and Rawls moral prin-
ciples are consistent with the psychological mechanism presented
here. They merely introduce additional cognitions which had not
previously been taken into account. Whereas the “natural” psy-
chological mechanism identiﬁes people as child-like on the basis
of resemblance and membership of that same group, the moral
principles compel us to ignore this component and relate to all
suffering people as child-like. In other words, the moral princi-
ples employ the same parameters to moral judgment; a dyadic
structure drawing a dividing line between child-like and adult-
like, “computing” the relative strengths between the two parties,
and assessing the extent to which expectations have been violated.
However, in the course of this assessment the moral principles
require us to entirely ignore our afﬁnity to one or other of the two
parties in the dyad on the basis of resemblance, shared interests,
or any other kind of subjective factors besides the parameters of
the general dyadic rules.
Let us assume that an individual experiences a sense of iden-
tity with and empathy for members of his own national group
but that he has no such feelings for other nationalities. However,
the moral principle dictates that every person is entitled to a set
of basic human rights irrespective of which national grouping
he or she belongs to. This cognition makes moral judgment far
more complex. From then on, when making a moral judgment
the system has another constraint: it will hesitate before allowing
itself to offer any form of discriminatory preferential treatment to
people belonging to that particular national group. It will direct
itself to recognize the suffering of anyone who is not a member of
that nationality. Though the affective mechanism can detach itself
from the new constraint, as indeed often happens, it is nonethe-
less capable of including this cognition in reaching its judgment.
Moral principles such as those of Kant and Rawls have an interest
in extending the mechanism of the psychological system to apply
to all peoples on the basis of equality. They teach us to curb per-
sonal considerations and subjective associations and be guided by
our natural system to reach a moral judgment by relying solely
on one consideration: to what extent did the adult-like party (any
human being) violate our expectations by the way in which he
behaved toward the child-like party (any human being) in any
given moral dyad.
CONCLUSION
Ethics of care was the ﬁrst theory to challenge the Kohlbergian –
Kantian view that moral judgment is determined by rational psy-
chological processes. In moral psychology it was the ﬁrst theory
to present a model of moral judgment based on emotions. The
empirically based research ﬁndings in moral psychology consis-
tently indicate that ethic of care’s intuition in the matter was
correct: emotions do indeed play a decisive role in moral judg-
ments. However, the theory itself has become marginalized and
irrelevant. Worse still, although contemporary infant research has
demonstrated that infants possess basic moral faculties, the care-
giver’s role in the development of these faculties and the inﬂuence
of parental care on the newborn has been entirely abandoned.
Only in feminist or psychoanalytic theories are interactions with
the infant regarded as central to moral development.
Ethics of care uncovered an important and universal axiom
of human ethics. Throughout the history of western thought
language, morality, and the sharp division between reason and
emotion, have been employed to exclude women (and other
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groups outside thewhitemale dominatedmainstream) frombeing
acknowledged as rightful contributors to knowledge.
In thismatter, care ethics have played a signiﬁcant role by focus-
ing on the importance of affect and emotion to reassessments of
rationalism and the assumed role of impartiality in the accumu-
lation of knowledge. As Greeno and Maccoby (1986, p. 310) have
noted: “Gilligan’s book was intended to right a wrong.”
But today, empirical studies show that infant–parent interac-
tion seems to be an adequate moral imperative for all men and all
women and the association of parental carewithwomen’smorality
alone is less relevant.
If psychology of care is to succeed in the long run as amoral psy-
chology, it must be bolder and more revolutionary, reshaping the
core of moral psychology. If psychology of care is to ﬂourish in the
21st century, the prevailing theoretical frameworks must be dis-
carded and replacedwith a single integrativemodel that seamlessly
connects with cutting-edge research in mainstream psychology. A
new paradigm for psychology of care, an attachment approach
to moral judgment, must emerge or the theory will perish as a
moral psychology. I suggest that an advance in our understanding
of the way care in the ﬁrst year of life organizes the mind, is an
opportunity to create closer ties between the previously separate
domains of moral psychology, ethics of care, infant research, and
attachment theory.
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